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Past research has found that high levels of causal uncertainty (cu) are as-
sociated with less reliance on available stereotypes. In the current research, 
we examined lack of category fit and a consequent movement along the 
impression formation continuum as the underlying process. Participants 
who were high or low in cu read about an honors student or junior. They 
learned 10 details: 5 suggested a low gPA and 5 suggested a high gPA. We 
found that high compared to low cu participants relied on the honors stu-
dent stereotype less and predicted a lower gPA in the honors student con-
dition. This effect was mediated by perceived typicality. high compared to 
low cu participants thought the target resembled a typical honors student 
to a lesser extent. In addition, an examination of participants’ open-ended 
comments about the target revealed that high compared to low cu partici-
pants were further along the impression formation continuum. 
People have a primary need to understand cause-and-effect relations in the social 
world (Heider, 1958). Unfortunately, the causal structure of social events often is 
complex, vague, and difficult to verify. Our causal analyses, therefore, frequently 
are probabilistic and may be associated with beliefs and feelings that we do not 
completely comprehend reality. Consider the seemingly happily married couple 
who suddenly files for divorce or, worse, the shooting of students and teachers at 
Virginia Tech. Both such events likely would give rise to questions about how well 
we understand the underlying causal structure. Both might well result in a search 
for more information to repair our state of knowledge about the world in which 
we live. 
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Weary and Edwards (1996) have presented a model that focuses on such be-
liefs and feelings of causal uncertainty (CU). More specifically, they have argued 
that perceptions of response-outcome noncontingency, or the sense that one can-
not control one’s outcomes, can result in frequent perceptions of unpredictability, 
repeated activation of CU feelings and beliefs, and ultimately, a chronic lack of 
confidence in one’s ability to understand why events occur in the social world. 
Chronic CU beliefs, in turn, can further threaten one’s sense of prediction and con-
trol (Edwards & Weary, 1998; Jacobson, Weary, & Edwards, 1999). 
Accordingly, Weary and Edwards (1996) have proposed that individuals chroni-
cally high in CU often try to improve their state of causal understanding. They do 
so by adopting one of a number of strategies designed to foster a more accurate 
understanding of the causal forces at work. For example, high CU individuals 
have been found to select more diagnostic questions to ask in an interview (Wea-
ry & Jacobson, 1997), to scrutinize available causal explanations (Tobin & Weary, 
2008) and situational constraint information (Weary, Vaughn, Stewart, & Edwards, 
2006), and to correct their judgments for salient biases (Vaughn & Weary, 2003). 
cAusAl uNcERTAINTy ANd sTEREOTyPINg
Recent work has extended the examination of motivated processing differences 
characteristic of high and low CU individuals into the realm of stereotyping. This 
work has uncovered an association between accessible CU beliefs and stereotype 
avoidance. Specifically, Weary and her colleagues found that when asked to read 
an ambiguous academic misconduct case summary and estimate the likelihood 
that a student-defendant was guilty, the judgments of high, in contrast to low, 
CU individuals were not influenced by an available stereotype (Weary, Jacobson, 
Edwards, & Tobin, 2001). These researchers argued that the judgments of high CU 
participants did not reveal stereotype effects because task instructions activated 
their CU beliefs and associated accuracy goals. That, in turn, led to a thought-
ful and systematic processing of all available information. In the current research, 
we draw upon the continuum model of impression formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990) to articulate further the process underlying stereotype avoidance of high CU 
perceivers.
ThE cONTINuuM MOdEl
Fiske and her colleagues argue that perceivers initially categorize a target based on 
salient features or verbally conveyed labels and then attempt to confirm this cat-
egorization (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Characteristics 
of the target and the perceivers’ levels of motivation can affect whether or not they 
move beyond this initial processing stage. For instance, it may be hard for perceiv-
ers to maintain their original categorizations if they learn that the target possesses 
attributes that are inconsistent with their prior knowledge of the categories. In 
addition, some perceivers may have lower thresholds for inconsistent information 
and may decide more readily that the target does not fit an initial category very 
well.
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If perceivers detect a poor fit, then they may try to find a better fitting category. 
In so doing, they may access subcategories, exemplars, self-schemas, or new cat-
egories (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). If a better fitting category were 
found, perceivers’ judgments would be influenced by stored knowledge associ-
ated with it, instead of knowledge associated with the original category. However, 
if the recategorization stage fails to produce a category that provides a satisfactory 
fit to the target’s characteristics or if perceivers are particularly motivated to get 
to know a person as an individual, then they might well progress to the piecemeal 
integration stage. In this stage, the target’s salient social categories are represented 
simply as attributes (along with other acquired pieces of target information), and 
perceivers attempt to mentally aggregate the individual details. Thus, category-
based knowledge has less of an influence on overall impressions when perceivers 
engage in piecemeal processing. 
The continuum model has implications for the present consideration of the pro-
cess or processes underlying the avoidance of stereotypes by high CU perceiv-
ers. Based on their motivation to reach an accurate understanding of the social 
world, we would expect high compared to low CU perceivers to be less tolerant 
of stereotype-inconsistent information. Accordingly, when a moderate amount of 
stereotype inconsistent information exists, high compared to low CU perceivers 
should more readily move beyond the initial confirmatory categorization stage. 
ThE cuRRENT REsEARch
The primary goal of the current research was to examine the role of perceived tar-
get-category fit in stereotype avoidance among high CU perceivers. We presented 
high and low CU perceivers with information about a target and asked them to 
predict his GPA. Some participants received a category label with implications 
for GPA: the target was an honors student. Participants received ten additional 
details about the student: half were stereotype-consistent and half were stereo-
type-inconsistent. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue that when individuals are pro-
vided with this type of mixed information, confirmatory categorization is likely to 
succeed, making recategorization and piecemeal processing less likely. Thus, we 
would expect our low CU perceivers to be able to accommodate the stereotype-
inconsistent details and render a judgment consistent with their stereotypes about 
the original category. However, high CU perceivers’ greater accuracy motivation 
and consequent lower tolerance for inconsistent information should prompt them 
to recategorize the target. 
Accordingly, we expected high compared to low CU participants to perceive 
the honors student as less typical, and to predict a lower GPA, as a result. We also 
coded participants’ thoughts for evidence of original category confirmation, recat-
egorization, or piecemeal processing (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). We predicted that 
high compared to low CU participants would be further along the continuum.
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pilOT STuDiES
PIlOT sTudy 1: sTEREOTyPE KNOWlEdgE 
We first sought to demonstrate that high and low CU perceivers do not differ in 
their knowledge of stereotypes about honor students. Twenty participants quick-
ly generated characteristics that came to mind when they thought about various 
social groups (e.g., male honors student), regardless of whether they personally 
believed the ideas to be true. Participants also completed the Causal Uncertainty 
Scale (CUS). The CUS measures chronic individual differences in causal uncer-
tainty beliefs (Weary & Edwards, 1994). This scale consists of 14 items that express 
uncertainty about the causes of positive and negative events that happen to the 
self and others (e.g., “I do not understand what causes most of the good things that 
happen to me,” “When I see something bad happen to others, I often do not know 
why it happened”). Participants rated on 6-point scales the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement. 
We content analyzed the characteristics that participants listed in response to 
the male honors student prompt. Common stereotypes listed by more than one 
third of participants included smart (92%), hardworking (54%), and nerd (42%). 
Logistic regressions revealed no significant associations between CU scores and 
knowledge of these stereotypes, ps > .10. 
PIlOT sTudy 2: TARgET BEhAVIORs
Good grades are necessary for admittance into and continuation in the honors 
program, so we designed details with mixed implications for grades. Thirty intro-
ductory psychology students received packets containing 36 behavior statements 
followed by the CUS (Weary & Edwards, 1994). For each of the 36 statements, 
participants were asked to rate on an 11-point scale how useful each piece of infor-
mation would be in predicting a person’s GPA (-5 = very diagnostic of a low GPA, 
0 = not diagnostic at all, 5 = very diagnostic of a high GPA). Based on participants’ 
ratings of the details, we selected 5 high GPA (M = 1.46, SD = .57) and 5 low GPA 
(M = -1.18, SD = .10) behaviors (see Appendix A). The items in the high and low 
GPA sets were roughly equidistant from the mean, and they were not perceived 
differently as a function of CU, ps > .14. 
maiN STuDy
PARTIcIPANTs
One hundred ninety-three students (103 females, 90 males) participated in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. They were randomly assigned either to the 
honors student or control condition. The data for 10 participants were excluded 
from analyses for the following reasons: 8 participants skipped through one of the 
main instruction screens or questions in fewer than 300 ms (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000) and 2 participants spent substantially longer on the target materials than the 
CauSal uNCErTaiNTy aND STErEOTypE avOiDaNCE 921
rest of the participants (greater than 4 SD above the mean1). After these exclusions, 
the sample consisted of 99 female and 84 male participants.
PROcEduRE
Participants completed the experiment in groups of up to seven, with each partici-
pant assigned to an individual cubicle. A computer program guided them through 
the experiment. After entering some demographic information, they were told 
that the experiment was about how people form impressions of others from vari-
ous types of information and how they use those impressions in making predic-
tions. They were told that they would be presented information about a student 
named Jack. Half of the participants learned that Jack was an honors student; the 
other half learned that he was a junior. Participants then read ten details about 
Jack. Half of the details were suggestive of a high GPA and half were suggestive 
of a low GPA.
After reading the details, one screen at a time, participants were given three min-
utes to think about the information provided and list any thoughts they may have 
had about Jack. Then, participants were asked to predict Jack’s GPA. They were 
told that they might or might not find the information that they had just received 
useful in making their predictions; they should just make their best guess about 
Jack’s GPA. They also were told to enter the average GPA for Ohio State students 
(3.0) if they felt they did not have enough information to make a prediction.2 After 
predicting the target’s GPA and depending upon condition, participants rated on 
an 11-point scale the degree to which the target resembled a typical honors student 
or junior (not at all; very much).3
In an ostensibly unrelated second study, participants were asked to complete a 
scale for researchers in the Psychology Department, who were collecting reliabil-
ity and validity data. They completed the CUS (Weary & Edwards, 1994). Lastly, 
participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and given the oppor-
tunity to provide written comments about the experiment. 
rESulTS
For all analyses involving continuous predictors such as CU scores, we standard-
ized both the continuous predictor and dependent variables (Friedrich, 1982). Simi-
lar to centering continuous predictor variables (Aiken & West, 1991), this approach 
1. It is likely that such an extreme departure from the average reading time indicates lack of 
understanding, interruption of the session, or use of a different processing style. 
2. A small percentage of participants entered this base-rate GPA value (14%). A logistic regression 
revealed no significant main or interactive effects of CU or category information, ps > .41. 
3. We included an exploratory manipulation of processing goal. Half of the participants were 
told that they should try to avoid bias (e.g., stereotypic preconceptions) when forming their 
impressions and making their predictions. Our initial analyses revealed only one significant effect 
of goal condition (i.e., lower typicality ratings in the avoid bias condition). Because the effect was 
not moderated by category information condition, it probably reflected participants’ attempts to 
follow the avoid bias instructions. However, any such attempts did not affect GPA estimates or any 
of the results reported. We might have obtained more of an effect on GPA estimates if we had used a 
category with salient negative stereotypes. 
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helps to reduce multicollinearity. In addition, it ensures that the unstandardized 
coefficients are, in fact, the appropriate standardized solutions for the interaction 
terms. However, for illustration purposes, the original scales of the dependent 
variables were retained for graphs. All dichotomous variables were effects-coded.
cu scOREs
We first sought to demonstrate that CU scores were not influenced by our ma-
nipulation of category information. After computing CU scores (α = .91, M = 31.48, 
SD = 10.77), we regressed them on category information condition (+1 = honors 
student, -1 = junior). There was no significant association, p = .96. 
gPA PREdIcTIONs
Next, we regressed GPA predictions on category information condition, CU scores, 
and the two-way interaction. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of cat-
egory information condition, β = .26, t(179) = 3.70, p < .001, such that participants 
estimated a higher GPA for the honors student than for the junior. In addition, the 
CU X Category Information condition interaction was significant, β = -.16, t(179) = 
-2.24, p < .05 (see Figure 1).
Simple slope tests revealed a significant association between CU and GPA esti-
mates in the honors student condition, β = -.24, t(179) = -2.23, p < .05, but not in 
the junior condition, β = .08, t(179) = 0.84, p = .40. In the honors student condition, 
higher CU levels were associated with lower GPA estimates.4 
PERcEIVEd TyPIcAlITy
Next, we regressed participants’ typicality ratings on category information con-
dition, CU, and the two-way interaction. This analysis revealed two significant 
effects: a main effect of category information, β = -.19, t(179) = -2.61, p < .05, and 
a CU X Category Information condition interaction, β = -.19, t(179) = -2.66, p < .01 
(see Figure 2).
Simple slope tests revealed a significant association between CU and perceived 
typicality in the honors student condition, β = -.26, t(179) = -2.38, p < .05, but not 
in the junior condition, β = .13, t(179) = 1.31, p = .19. As predicted, in the honors 
student condition, higher CU levels were associated with lower typicality ratings. 
MEdIATIONAl ANAlysEs
According to the continuum model, low perceived fit with the initial category 
prompts motivated perceivers to engage in recategorization and, if necessary, 
4. As in Weary et al. (2001), we also examined the effect of category information among low CU 
participants, β = .42, t(179) = 4.19, p < .001, and among high CU participants, β = .10, t(179) = 1.01, p = 
.32. Only low CU participants estimated a higher GPA for the honors student compared to the junior.
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piecemeal integration (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Theoretically, then, we would ex-
pect the lower GPA estimates among high CU participants in the honors student 
condition to be due to reductions in target typicality. Following standard recom-
mendations for mediational analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & Yzer-
byt, 2005), we examined this possibility. First, we regressed the outcome variable 
(GPA) on CU scores. We found that higher CU scores were associated with signifi-
cantly lower GPA estimates, β = -.21, t(89) = -2.04, p < .05. Second, we regressed the 
mediator (perceived typicality) on CU scores. This analysis revealed that higher 
CU scores were associated with significantly lower typicality ratings, β = -.23, t(89) 
= -2.23, p < .05. Third, we regressed the outcome variable (GPA) on the mediator 
(perceived typicality) and CU scores. This analysis revealed that higher typical-
ity ratings were associated with significantly higher GPA estimates, β = .38, t(88) 
= 3.80, p < .001. Furthermore, controlling for the mediator, CU scores no longer 
significantly predicted GPA estimates, β = -.12, t(88) = -1.25, p = .21 (see Figure 3). 
A Sobel (1982) test revealed that reduction in the CU-GPA path was significant, Z 
= -1.93, p = .05. We also should note that perceived typicality did not interact with 
CU to predict GPA (p = .98). 
Next, we examined an alternate mediational model where GPA estimates me-
diated the influence of CU on perceived typicality. As noted above, higher CU 
scores were associated with significantly lower typicality ratings and GPA esti-
mates. When we regressed typicality ratings on CU scores and the potential me-
diator (GPA), we found that GPA was a significant predictor, β = .37, t(88) = 3.80, 
p < .001, but CU was not, β = -.15, t(88) = -1.54, p = .13. A Sobel test revealed that 
the reduction in the CU-Typicality path was close to significant, Z = -1.79, p = .07. 
Although support for the reverse model was not quite as strong, it may be the case 
that rendering stereotypic (counterstereotypic) judgments led perceivers to view 
the target as even more (less) typical of the original category. 
fIguRE 1. gPA predictions as a function of cu and category information.
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ThOughT cOdINg ANd ANAlysEs
In the honors student condition, blind to CU scores, participants’ thoughts about 
the target were scored in a way that would reflect points along the continuum of 
impression formation processes identified by Fiske and Neuberg (1990). A set of 
thoughts was coded as 1 (confirmatory categorization) if participants either failed 
to mention any of the stereotype-inconsistent details or their implications, or men-
tioned at least one but reinterpreted it with respect to the general honors student 
category. A set of thoughts was coded as 2 (recategorization) if participants men-
tioned at least one stereotype-inconsistent detail and interpreted it with respect to 
a subcategory (e.g., honors student due to external pressure, honors student who 
does not need to study), a new category (e.g., typical student), themselves (e.g., 
he is like me), or an exemplar (e.g., he is like a person from my high school). A set 
of thoughts was coded as 3 (no category) if participants mentioned at least one 
stereotype-inconsistent detail, but did not interpret it with respect to any category. 
Also blind to participants’ CU scores, a second coder rated a subset of the thoughts 
(n = 36) so that we could examine inter-rater reliability. Agreement was substantial 
(Landis & Koch, 1977), Kappa = .68. Overall, 23% of the thoughts indicated con-
firmatory categorization (3% did not mention any inconsistent detail, 20% men-
tioned at least one but reinterpreted it in a manner consistent with the initial cat-
egory), 56% indicated some type of recategorization (33% utilized a subcategory, 
20% mentioned a new category, 2% made a self reference, and 1% mentioned an 
exemplar), and 21% did not indicate a category.
We first regressed thought content scores on CU scores. As predicted, higher CU 
scores were associated with higher stages of processing, β = .25, t(89) = 2.39, p < 
.05. We then examined thought scores for those one SD above (high CU) and below 
(low CU) the mean CU score. Although both values were near the scale midpoint 
fIguRE 2. Perceived typicality as a function of cu and category information.
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(recategorization), low CU participants were just below it (M = 1.81), whereas high 
CU participants (M = 2.14) were just above it. 
Next, we examined whether perceived typicality mediated the influence of CU 
on type of impression process. We already have seen that CU scores significantly 
predicted both thought content scores, β = .25, t(89) = 2.39, p < .05, and typicality 
ratings, β = -.23, t(89) = -2.23, p < .05. Next, we regressed thought content scores 
on typicality ratings and CU scores, after establishing that the predictors did not 
interact with each other (p = .75). Lower typicality scores were associated with 
higher thought content scores, β = -.33, t(88) = -3.31, p < .01. Furthermore, control-
ling for typicality, CU became a nonsignificant predictor of thought content scores, 
β = .17, t(88) = 1.69, p = .10. A Sobel test revealed that the drop in predictive power 
was close to significant, Z = 1.85, p = .06. 
Lastly, we examined whether thought content scores predicted GPA estimates. 
As expected, thoughts that were further along the impression formation continu-
um were associated with lower GPA estimates, β = -.33, t(89) = -3.31, p < .01.
DiSCuSSiON
As predicted, when the student was described as an honors student, higher lev-
els of CU were associated with lower GPA predictions. Mediational analyses sup-
ported our argument that this effect occurred because high CU participants saw 
the student as less typical of his category. Specifically, in the honors condition, 
higher CU predicted lower perceived typicality, which in turn, predicted lower 
GPA estimates. Furthermore, controlling for typicality significantly reduced the 
CU-GPA association. 
An examination of participants’ open-ended responses supported our argument 
that the thoughts of high compared to low CU individuals were further from the 
confirmatory categorization stage. Additionally, a mediational analysis supported 
the idea that the relationship between CU and stage on the impression formation 
fIguRE 3. Perceived typicality as a mediator of the cu-gPA association in the honors student 
condition.
Note. *indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .001.
 
-.23* 
Perceived 
typicality 
Causal 
Uncertainty 
GPA 
estimate 
-.12, ns (-.21*) 
.38** 
926 TOBiN ET al.
continuum was due to high CU participants having viewed the target as a less 
typical member of the original category. According to the continuum model, it 
is poor fit that prompts movement along the information processing continuum: 
from confirmatory categorization to recategorization to piecemeal integration. 
POssIBlE AlTERNATIVE ExPlANATIONs
Curious readers may wonder whether the effects we report here might have been 
due not to CU but to a related individual difference, such as negative affect, con-
cerns about appearing prejudiced, or indecisiveness. These possibilities were ex-
amined in a study that used Weary et al.’s (2001) academic misconduct paradigm 
(Tobin, Weary, Wichman, & Jacobson, 2001). In this study, high and low CU per-
ceivers read about an athlete or junior who was accused of cheating on a test. An 
adaptation of the Differential Emotions Scale (DES) was used to measure posi-
tive and negative state affect (Cacioppo, Martzke, Petty, & Tassinary, 1988). The 
Motivation to Control Prejudice Responding Scale (MCPRS) was used to assess 
individual differences in the desire to inhibit the expression of prejudice (Dunton 
& Fazio, 1997). The Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCS) was used to measure 
chronic individual differences in the desire, when faced with a decision or judg-
ment, to possess an answer, any answer, compared to confusion and ambiguity 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This NFCS contained five subscales: preferences 
for order and predictability, decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and close-
mindedness. Higher levels of CU were associated with higher levels of negative 
affect (r = .46, p < .001), higher motivation to control prejudice responding (r = .23, 
p < .05), and lower levels of decisiveness (r = -.46, p < .001). 
Separate regressions examined whether any of these individual differences af-
fected participants’ reliance on stereotypes in the academic misconduct paradigm. 
Only one individual difference interacted with category information to predict 
participants’ guilt ratings: preference for predictability, β = -.23, t(90) = -2.18, p < 
.05. However, simple slopes tests revealed that preference for predictability was 
associated with guilt judgments only when no category information had been pro-
vided, β = 0.45, t(90) = 2.65, p < .05. In addition, when preference for predictability, 
CU scores, category information, cognitive load, and all interactions were included 
as predictors of guilt, only a preference for predictability main effect, β = .26, t(82) 
= 2.30, p < .05, and a CU X Category Information interaction were obtained. Differ-
ences in need for cognitive closure, motivation to control prejudiced responding, 
and negative affect, then, neither accounted for nor moderated the interaction of 
category information and CU. 
We also direct interested readers to Weary et al. (2001) for additional tests in-
volving the following correlates of CU: affect, perceived control, personal need for 
structure, need for cognition, and depression. None of these constructs accounted 
for the findings of stereotype avoidance among high CU perceivers. 
cONclusIONs
Overall then, we conclude that stereotype avoidance among high CU perceivers is 
due to a heightened desire to form accurate perceptions and judgments of others. 
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In the current paradigm, this motivation resulted in a sensitivity to information 
suggesting a lack of category fit and consequent movement along the impression 
formation continuum. 
More generally, these findings highlight the critical role of target-category fit 
in impression formation. Stereotype inconsistent information can signal a lack of 
fit, particularly to accuracy-motivated perceivers, prompting recategorization and 
then possibly piecemeal integration. The availability of alternate categories like-
ly determines the success of recategorization attempts and determines whether 
piecemeal integration is necessary.
appENDix a. aDDiTiONal TargET iNfOrmaTiON.
Jack always talks about how hard his classes are. (L)
One of Jack’s parents is a professor. (H)
Jack seldom participates in class discussion. (L)
Jack watches public television shows on science whenever he can. (H)
Jack says that he finds most of his classes boring. (L)
Jack has lots of friends who are honors students. (H)
Jack does not read unless he has to. (L)
Jack answers questions in class frequently. (H)
Jack goes to parties all the time. (L)
Jack often lets his friends borrow his notes. (H) 
Items marked with an (h) suggested a high gPA, whereas those marked with an (l) suggested a low gPA.
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